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Alternative Methods and
EU Policy-Making:
What Does “Co-Regulation”
Really Mean?1
By Dr Edward Best Dr Edward Best Dr Edward Best Dr Edward Best Dr Edward Best*
The Better Regulation agenda includes consideration of alternatives to regulation where EU
legislation is neither specifically required nor uniquely suitable. These take different forms. A
basic distinction can be made between two approaches involving measures which are not legally
binding. Policy coordination is a non-negotiable alternative to legislation laid down in the treaty.
Self-regulation and “co-regulation” in principle provide for a choice in particular cases, and
often a dynamic interplay between the threat of legislation and the credibility of private
commitments. It has not been clear, however, what “co-regulation” actually means in the EU
context. There are in fact two models. In the first, private EU-wide measures are seen as
alternatives, notably to Commission acts, for the implementation of EU legislation. In the
second, self-regulation is understood as an alternative to the EU legislation itself. In reality the
first model, which came to dominate the discourse of Better Lawmaking, has not materialized
and is unlikely to do so. Moreover, the second model in practice only consists of a choice between
self-regulation and legislation. Attempts at intermediate forms have so far failed to convince.
There are successful examples of self-regulation. It would be easier to understand and to exploit
such possibilities if political discourse were brought into line with policy practice.
possibilities of this “alternative” agenda – and indeed the
different usages of the term “alternative” – and, in this
perspective, offers a cautious evaluation of the viability of
some of those methods which are generally included under
the most elusive concept, that of “co-regulation”.
The first section proposes a simple categorisation for
these non-traditional approaches based on two dimensions:
the underlying mode of governance and the nature of the
interaction between public and private actors. Market-
based instruments offer alternative instruments within the
hierarchical mode of governance. Beyond this, a basic
distinction is proposed between a) non-binding coordination
of national policies as compared to EU legislation and b)
self- and co-regulation as “alternatives” to traditional
regulation by (EU) public authorities. The second section
summarises the different understandings of ”co-regulation”
which are currently used in the context of EU policy-making.
In each case it reviews briefly the state of play in terms of
the practical results achieved.
The conclusion is that some elements in the first phase
of co-regulatory experimentation have been unsuccessful
or even misconceived. In the end, what both public and
private actors most need are arrangements which guarantee
a “level playing field” where competitive conditions are
concerned, as well as pursuit of legitimate public interests
(such as health and safety, or protection of the environment)
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
Since the late 1980s, the European Union has been
exploring methods of common action which do not reflect
the supranational legislative approach by which the
Community was constructed, and on which the heart of the
system still rests. That approach has essentially been
characterised by an acceptance of hierarchy (the primacy
of Community law) as the primary mode of governance,
and by the “Community method” of decision-making: the
Commission has the exclusive right of legislative initiative
and decisions are taken by the Council (preferably by
majority vote) in interaction with the Parliament, all under
the supranational control of the Court. Private actors are
consulted.
Some of these new methods have taken the form of
intergovernmental cooperation. Others have emerged as
different approaches to certain aspects of economic and
social affairs within the Community. These have taken
distinct forms and have been pursued for a variety of
reasons. They have, however, tended to be lumped together
as “alternative” instruments in the Better Regulation arsenal,
supposedly offering different options for achieving policy
goals which may be preferable to classic prescriptive
regulation.
This contribution sets out to clarify the parameters andwww.eipa.eu
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with the greatest simplicity and the lowest cost possible. This
may in some cases be better achieved through self-
regulation. In others, well-made public regulation will be
preferred by everyone. Messy compromises in the middle
will, it increasingly seems, in the end satisfy no-one.
Alternative Methods Alternative Methods Alternative Methods Alternative Methods Alternative Methods
The changing political context The changing political context The changing political context The changing political context The changing political context
The emergence of new methods has been significantly
shaped by a changing political context in the EU. At this
general level, indeed, non-legislative approaches can
properly be considered together as a set of alternatives to
legislation, following what has sometimes been termed
“horizontal subsidiarity”. This debate goes back at least to
1992.
The Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic
Community (EEC) originally stated that “Each institution
shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by
this Treaty.” (Article 4(1) TEEC 1957 emphasis added). The
main issue, in other words, was the balance between the
European institutions when dealing with matters delegated
to the European level, rather than the delineation of
competences between levels of government. The Maastricht
Treaty on European Union (TEU) modified this to read that
“The Community shall act within the limits of the powers
conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives
assigned to it therein.”(Article 3b TEC 1992, emphasis
added).2 In response to broad concerns about the limits on
Community competences, as the internal market was
legislatively completed by 1992, the primary issue in the
treaty was now one of “vertical” subsidiarity. Except where
“exclusive competences” are concerned, the Community
should only act “in so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States
and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community”.
In the context of the efforts made to provide further
reassurances as to the limits of Community impingement,
following the negative result of the Danish referendum in
June 1992, the Edinburgh European Council in December
1992 also developed what has been termed “horizontal
subsidiarity”.
“The Community should legislate only to the extent
necessary. Other things being equal, directives should
be preferred to regulations and framework directives to
detailed measures. Non-binding measures such as
recommendations should be preferred where
appropriate. Consideration should be given where
appropriate to the use of voluntary codes of conduct.”3
The assumption was, in other words, that different policy
instruments should in principle be considered, with a
certain preferential option for the non-legislative and with
the burden of proof placed on those proposing legislation.
Different groups of “alternative” methods Different groups of “alternative” methods Different groups of “alternative” methods Different groups of “alternative” methods Different groups of “alternative” methods
In 2001, responding to the various challenges to the classic
“Community method” which had emerged over the 1990s,
the European Commission presented a White Paper on
Governance in which these two dimensions were reflected.
The Commission stressed that “proposals must be prepared
on the basis of an effective analysis         of whether it is
appropriate to intervene at EU level and whether regulatory
intervention is needed. If so, the analysis must also assess
the potential economic, social and environmental impact,
as well as the costs and benefits of that particular approach”
(CEC 2001, 20). If regulatory intervention were not
considered necessary, however, alternatives should be
considered.
The Commission’s 2005 Impact Assessment Guidelines
thus indicate that there are “normally a number of different
policy instruments available to reach (operational)
objectives”. Commission services should consider different
options from a set ranging from prescriptive regulatory
actions at one extreme, through framework directives, co-
regulation, financial interventions, market-based
instruments, information and guidelines, the open method
of coordination, to monitored self-regulation at the other.4
This way of presenting alternative instruments partly
reflects the Commission’s own institutional perspective and
interest in retaining as far as possible its agenda-setting
role (although others too tend to lump everything together).
These different instruments do not in fact constitute a single
continuum of options ranging from “hardest” to “softest”
options. For present purposes, one can distinguish groups,
in terms of a) the underlying mode of governance/steering
(conceived as a continuum ranging from hierarchy and
sanctions at one extreme, through incentives and bargaining
as in intergovernmental agreements, to persuasion and
learning at the other); b) the nature of the interaction
between public and private actors; and c) in what sense, if
at all, there is actually any choice between methods.
Market-based instruments Market-based instruments Market-based instruments Market-based instruments Market-based instruments
The first group consists of market-based instruments, mainly
taxation or systems for the trading of permits (OECD 2002,
2006).
Underlying mode of governance
The underlying principle remains hierarchy, inasmuch as
these instruments are usually legally binding and adopted
by public authorities.
Public-private interaction
These instruments rely not on the threat of legal action but
on market signals (that is, prices) to provide incentives for
business and citizens to act in a way which will achieve the
public policy objective.
Choice
Although these instruments tend to be complementary
rather than alternative with regard to regulation, they do in
principle offer a choice for policy-makers.
Non-binding policy coordination Non-binding policy coordination Non-binding policy coordination Non-binding policy coordination Non-binding policy coordination
The second group consists of forms of cooperation between
Member States which take place within the Community (as
opposed to the intergovernmental pillars of the Union) but
are not legally binding. The various forms of non-binding
policy coordination which are now generically referred to
as the “open method of coordination” (OMC) emerged as
alternative forms of cooperation where some kind of
common action needed to (be seen to) be pursued, but no
legislative competence was given to the Community. Instead,
the Member States agreed to tailor their national policies
around common goals and guidelines – and to compare
them on the basis of common indicators and benchmarks
– in order to promote convergence and improvements in
policy performance. This started with the Broad Economic
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Policy Guidelines (BEPG) established by the Maastricht
Treaty; was followed by the Employment Guidelines
introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty; and then spread, with
lower levels of ambition in terms of recommendations
which could be issued to individual Member States, to social
protection, social inclusion, research, enterprise and
innovation, education and other domains of the Lisbon
Strategy.
Underlying mode of governance
The basic mode of governance involved is non-hierarchical
coordination through competition, with the goals of
persuasion and learning. Governments are expected to
follow the guidelines, and then respond to specific Council
Recommendations, peer pressure through benchmarking,
and the demands of their own national stakeholders and
publics. The objectives include convergence and the
achievement of common targets – with more or less
precision according to the case – but the fundamental goal
is improved national policy performance in the spirit of
mutual learning.
Public-private interaction
The role of private actors is essential for achieving the basic
goals at stake and their participation in shaping national
plans is a fundamental part of the process. However, this
kind of policy coordination is primarily a matter of different
degrees of commitment and exchange between countries.
Choice of methods
It is mainly at the level of treaty reform that one can see
OMC and legislation as policy options: that is, when the
basic rules of the game are being decided.         Whereas it is
conceivable for the Commission to propose some form of
policy coordination in particular cases even where the EU
does have legislative competence, there is no prospect of
moving to binding measures if the results of OMC were to
be considered inadequate if it does not have that
competence.
Co-regulation Co-regulation Co-regulation Co-regulation Co-regulation
The third group is the hardest to pin down in conceptual
terms and has proved to be the most elusive to put into
practice.
Underlying mode of governance
The basic issue in this case is not the mode of governance,
which may vary, but the relationship between public and
private actors. Indeed, one can (slightly stretching the point)
see the same continuum of governance modes in the ways
that non-state actors organize themselves at European
level. At one extreme, national football associations accept
the hierarchical authority of UEFA and even the legitimacy
of sanctions which may be imposed on them. In between,
there are a significant number of professional and industrial
Codes of Conduct at European level, which are voluntarily
entered into in response to perceived incentives. Finally, at
the other extreme, one finds cases in which European social
partners have adopted “frameworks of action” in areas
such as gender equality and lifelong learning, in a sort of
OMC between private actors.
Public-private interaction
As described in more detail below, quite different models
of public-private interaction are encompassed here. The
different sub-groups may be classified in the first instance
in terms of two fundamental dimensions. On the “vertical”
dimension of the co-regulatory universe, specified private
actors are seen as having a particular role and responsibility
in the implementation of rules adopted by the EU legislator.
On the “horizontal” dimension, the interaction is a dynamic
relationship: a sliding scale determined by the interplay
between the threat of regulatory intervention (“the shadow
of the law”) and the credibility of self-regulatory mechanisms
as means to respond to public-interest concerns.
Choice
In this case, therefore, the issue is not only that there may
in some cases (at least in theory) be a degree of choice as
to the modalities of putting into practice general EU rules
in specific cases. In many cases there may be a dynamic
interplay between the possibility of public regulation and
the credibility of self-regulation which will determine what
kind of action at EU level should be pursued.
The following section briefly presents the different models
of “co-regulation” which have been explored, indicating
the underlying logic of the public-private interaction involved,
as well as a cautious assessment of their results and
perspectives.
Co-Regulation Co-Regulation Co-Regulation Co-Regulation Co-Regulation
Two basic models of “co-regulation” may be discerned in
current discourse: a “vertical” model in which agreements
with private actors offer alternatives to comitology for the
purpose of implementing European legislation; and a
“horizontal” model which consists of a dynamic interplay
between the possibility of legislation and the credibility of
private commitments as alternative ways of dealing with
issues of public interest. Although the two models do
overlap, they are conceptually different.
Co-regulation I: EU legislation and private implementing Co-regulation I: EU legislation and private implementing Co-regulation I: EU legislation and private implementing Co-regulation I: EU legislation and private implementing Co-regulation I: EU legislation and private implementing
measures measures measures measures measures
This “vertical” concept has been the dominant model in EU
co-regulatory discourse. The Inter-Institutional Agreement
on Better Lawmaking of 2003 thus defines co-regulation as
“the mechanism whereby a Community legislative act
entrusts the attainment of objectives defined by the legislative
authority to parties which are recognised in the field (such
as economic operators, the social partners, NGOs or
associations)”.5
It originated in the EU context in the form of the “New
Approach”, which is generally considered to be the first
version of co-regulation in the Community. Formulated in
a 1985 Council Resolution as part of steps to break the
impasse in completing the internal market, this recognized
that this harmonization could in many cases be limited to
the definition of “essential requirements” (usually of health
and safety). Conformity with these requirements could be
shown either by conforming to harmonized standards
drawn up by standardization bodies or by other means. The
Commission has argued that:
“…the ‘New Approach’ has proven to be a specific
model of legislation by which both the public interest
(i.e. protecting public health and safety, consumer and
environmental protection) and the interest of private
business to produce standards according to the relevant
“state of the art”, could be merged in an adequate way.
It allows for more flexible and less stringent forms of
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legislation in areas where, otherwise, any detail would
have to be determined by the legislative act itself.”(CEC
2004b)
The Commission – and notably Commissioner
Verheugen – has explicitly presented this kind of “co-
regulation through standardization” as a model which
could be adopted in other sectors, including energy-using
products, environmental protection and transport.6
This approach had indeed also been shaped by
developments in environmental policy. Encouraged by
positive experiences with negotiated agreements in some
Member States (such as the system of “covenants” between
government and industry in the Netherlands) as well as by
global trends in the policy debate, the Commission began
in the early 1990s to promote such alternative methods. Yet
from early on the underlying modes and structures were not
clear. A 1996 Communication stated that “Legislation will
remain the necessary backbone of Community
environmental policy, but it needs to be supplemented by
market-based instruments and voluntary approaches. In
that respect, Environmental Agreements are an
implementation tool rather than a means of deregulation.”
Yet the Commission also argued that that the Community
could only use non-binding agreements rather than entering
into contractual arrangements with private parties by which
certain functions could be conditionally delegated. The
arrangements reached in the late 1990s with car
manufacturers therefore took the form of non-binding
Recommendations by which the Commission would simply
monitor voluntary commitments. In the face of concerns
about effectiveness, and under pressure from the European
Parliament to provide a clearer institutional and/or legislative
framework, the Commission pushed ahead. This resulted
in a 2002 Communication on Environmental Agreements
at European Level – explicitly adopted within the framework
of the Better Regulation action plan – very much in the spirit
of the Inter-Institutional Agreement cited above.
“Under coregulation arrangements, the European
Parliament and the Council would adopt, upon a
Proposal from the Commission, a Directive. This legal
act would stipulate that a precise, well-defined
environmental objective must be reached on a given
target date. It would also set the conditions for monitoring
compliance and introduce enforcement and appeal
mechanisms. It need not contain detailed provisions on
how to reach the objective. The legislator determines to
what extent defining and implementing the measures
can be left to the parties concerned because of the
experience they are acknowledged to have gained in
the field. These provisions must be compatible with
European competition law.” (CEC 2002)
Not one environmental agreement of the kind proposed
in the 2002 Communication has been adopted. One
apparently promising avenue has been provided by the
2005 Eco-design Directive, which lays down generic eco-
design requirements for energy-using products which are
sold in large volumes. The Commission should adopt an
implementing measure laying down specific requirements,
after the draft is approved by a “comitology” committee. As
an alternative, however, “voluntary agreements or other
self-regulation measures” should be encouraged “where
such action is likely to deliver the policy objectives faster or
in a less costly manner than mandatory requirements”.
These are to be assessed by a Consultation Forum
representing “a balanced participation of Member States’
representatives and all interested parties concerned” against
a set of indicative criteria, including the need for an
industrial association to represent “a large majority” of the
sector.7 There has so far been no proposal to take advantage
of this provision.
This “top-down” model of co-regulation, then, seems to
have failed to materialise, and there are some identifiable
obstacles to its doing so in the future. Notably, there is an
underlying tension, even contradiction, concerning
competition policy. In general, such arrangements can only
be effective if the sector concerned is more or less completely
covered by a small number of identifiable actors who can
represent the sector vis-à-vis the authorities and ensure
implementation of the agreements. Moreover, it is only in
the interest of the industries concerned to participate in such
arrangements (which require considerable coordination
efforts on their part) if there is no significant risk of cheating
by non-participants at their expense. However, complete
coverage of a sector by a few actors could be seen as abuse
of dominant position. In other words, the more a sector is
structured in ways that would make such co-regulation
work, the more likely it is that there will be concerns in terms
of competition policy.
Co-regulation II: legislation and self-regulation as Co-regulation II: legislation and self-regulation as Co-regulation II: legislation and self-regulation as Co-regulation II: legislation and self-regulation as Co-regulation II: legislation and self-regulation as
alternative approaches alternative approaches alternative approaches alternative approaches alternative approaches
In this more general sense “co-regulation” means a dynamic
interaction between public and private options for dealing
with areas in which a European public interest is at stake,
and which are not by their nature reserved for legislation.
In these cases, the possible assumption by private actors of
responsibilities is seen as inherently positive, whether in
terms of effectiveness (incentives to go beyond minimum
requirements, flexibility, rapidity, cost-effectiveness) or
legitimacy (stakeholder participation and good governance).
The authorities are nonetheless expected to monitor these
arrangements to ensure that public interests are attained.
If not, there may have to be recourse to law.
The first phase of exploring this dynamic in the 1990s
proved to be disappointing, partly because of the underlying
tension, or dilemma, which was involved. On the one hand,
self-regulation will not be effective, and probably will not
even be attempted, unless there is a credible threat of
regulatory intervention. On the other hand, self-regulation
may be encouraged by the Commission largely because
legislation is being blocked – in which case the “shadow of
the law” may be rather pale.
European Social Dialogue European Social Dialogue European Social Dialogue European Social Dialogue European Social Dialogue
This has been particularly clear in the case of the European
Social Dialogue – another of the classic cases of “co-
regulation” which are usually cited. The procedure agreed
at Maastricht (now Articles 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty)
provided that the Commission should consult European
social partners8 before submitting proposals. The social
partners could then choose to negotiate between themselves.
If the negotiations resulted in an agreement, two options
would be available for implementation: by the procedures
and practices specific to management and labour and the
Member States, or by a Council decision on a proposal
from the Commission. The latter course would make the
terms of the agreement legally binding for all citizens.
The first phase was largely driven by the dynamic of pre-
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emption of regulation. The 1990s saw a number of legislative
acts adopted by the Council on the basis of cross-industry
agreements reached between the social partners on parental
leave, part-time work, fixed-term work. These were largely
shaped by institutional interest and the prospect of legislation
or treaty reform (as had been the case in the initial
acceptance by the employers of the whole arrangement in
1991). A few sectoral agreements were also transformed
into Community law.
By 1999 both sides of the European social partnership
were clearly dissatisfied. The results of the cross-industry
agreements had been few and were considered pretty
meagre by many in the trade unions. Negotiations over
temporary agency work broke down in May 2001. The joint
contribution by the social partners to the Laeken European
Council in December 2001 stated their “wish to develop a
work programme for a more autonomous social dialogue”.
Since 2002 there have been various manifestations of this
tendency to come out from under the “shadow of the law”.
In some respects, the lead seemed to be taken over by the
social partners. In November 2002, the social partners
adopted a work programme for 2003-2005 in which they
indicated a series of autonomous initiatives for the coming
years. A second work programme for 2006-2008 was
signed in March 2006. In this context, moreover, the social
partners started to implement cross-sectoral framework
agreements by the non-legislative route: this has been the
case for telework, stress, and harassment and violence at
work.
While generally supporting these developments as a
new phase which strengthens the involvement of national
and/or private actors in European governance, the
Commission has insisted on the need to evaluate
implementation and to leave open the possibility of legislative
action (CEC 2004a). Moreover, there will continue to be
particular cases in which Community law may be used for
implementation. In July 2008 the relevant social partners
reached an agreement on maritime labour standards and
proposed that this should be implemented through Council
Directive, as was natural given the preceding agreement in
this sphere and the fact that the aim of the exercise was to
implement in the EU the 2006 Maritime Labour convention
of the International Labour Organization. However, the
original co-regulatory dynamics underlying the social
dialogue – whether the threat of “you negotiate or we
legislate” or the hope that “you negotiate because we can’t
legislate” – have been superseded by rather different
processes.
Environmental policy Environmental policy Environmental policy Environmental policy Environmental policy
The first explorations of co-regulatory interaction in the
environmental field have also proved to be disappointing,
as may be illustrated by two cases.
CO2 emissions from passenger vehicles
Even though emissions had been the subject of harmonised
standards since the 1970s, the Commission in 1995
started by proposing a negotiated agreement with
manufacturers rather than a directive when it came to
carbon dioxide.9 The Council supported this position despite
objections from Parliament, although not without
reservations on the part of some Member States. In the
course of the negotiations over the next two years, the
Council in fact offered to bolster the Commission’s
negotiating position by openly requesting it “if no satisfactory
result was obtained to submit to it a proposal for a Directive
containing binding restrictions”. In October 1998, however,
the Council approved the “environmental agreement” with
the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association
(ACEA) even though the industry’s substantive undertakings
still fell short of what the Council itself had demanded in
1996. It was technically only a unilateral commitment
made by the representative association. The individual
manufacturing companies were not actually party to the
agreements but merely “agreed to make every endeavour
to contribute to the achievement of ACEA’s commitments”.
As for the threat of legislation, the Council did in
October 1998 invite the Commission “to present
immediately proposals, including legislative proposals, for
consideration, should it become clear, on the basis of
monitoring and after consultation with ACEA, that ACEA
would not honour its commitments”. However, the
Commission quickly made it clear that it would only
exercise this right in 2008 or, no earlier than in 2003, if
sufficient progress were not made and if this was due to
factors beyond ACEA’s control. In the end, this has been a
classic example of how a weakly-based attempt at co-
regulation (meaning that the original agreement for a
monitored self-regulation was not established on the basis
of a strong position of the potential legislator) has had to
be replaced by legislation. Following confirmation that
several key manufacturers would not meet the agreed
targets, a legislative proposal was eventually submitted by
the Commission in December 2007. It now remains to be
seen what the final result will be in terms of the commitments
to be established by legislation.
Energy efficiency
Energy efficiency has been one of the areas in which non-
legislative methods have seemed to show greatest potential.
Four agreements on household appliances were endorsed
by the Commission in the late 1990s in the form of negative
clearances/exemptions under competition policy. These
were renewed and seemed to receive an informal blessing
from the Commission. In March 2007, however, the
European Committee of Domestic Equipment Manufacturers
(CECED)  announced that the association would
“discontinue” its voluntary energy efficiency agreements
for large appliances, calling for “legislative measures to
ensure future energy performance standards as an
alternative to continued updating of the voluntary
agreements”. Too many governments were failing to stop
“careless or unscrupulous” operators from claiming that
their products had better energy efficiency than they really
delivered.10 Without proper market surveillance and
enforcement, manufacturers which had made the effort to
improve products were not receiving their fair rewards in
terms of consumer choice. With targets now needing to
become even more ambitious, the stakes were even higher:
“To go the extra mile now manufacturers need to be very
sure that they will have a return on their investment.”11
What does this seem to show? First, it draws attention to
the fact that self-regulatory arrangements depend also on
continuing incentives for the industrial actors involved,
including effective public actions in assuring adequate
framework conditions – for example, universal enforcement
of regulations, or guaranteeing fair competition. Second,
choices made by industry with regard to regulatory
alternatives are inevitably shaped by commercial
considerations. In this case, the manufacturers’ position
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must be seen in the context of increased competition from
cheaper products imported from outside the EU, notably
from Asia, as much as the problem of improper labelling
(which has to some extent been exacerbated also by
enlargement). In exceptional conditions – as seem to have
existed for a decade or so with regard to European
household appliances – it may both satisfy co-regulatory
pursuits and make commercial sense to support voluntary
commitments which distinguish certain manufacturers from
others. It has been remarkably easy, however, for these
conditions to disappear and for a move to legislation then
to be promoted by the industrial interests concerned.
Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions
The universe of “alternative methods” in EU policy-making
in fact consists of several groups of approaches to European
common action which are quite different in their nature.
Some primarily refer to different kinds of cooperation
between countries, while others concern different forms of
interaction between public and private actors. Some
represent, at least in principle, different options for achieving
similar goals, while others are primarily complementary
measures within overall policy packages. Some of these
new approaches have been formalized in the treaties
themselves precisely as non-legislative methods, and there
is no sign that this may be changed in the foreseeable
future. Others – and this concerns much of the world of “co-
regulation” – represent continuing experiments which may
or may not be consolidated in their initial forms.
The formal definition of co-regulation as the conditional
delegation to non-state actors of responsibilities for the
detailed implementation of rules defined in EU legislation,
inspired by the New Approach for the internal market, has
in fact not been put into practice and is unlikely to be
adopted.
The first phases of exploration of co-regulatory dynamics
in the second sense proposed – a more “horizontal”
interplay between the possibility of regulatory intervention
and the credibility of private commitments – have largely
been unsuccessful.
Since then there have been cases in which unilateral
commitments have successfully pre-empted possible
legislative action at European level, in the sense of making
legislation unnecessary due to the effectiveness of self-
regulation. One good example is the European Declaration
on Paper Recovery adopted first in November 2000 and in
a new version in 2006.12 Another is the European Code of
Conduct for Clearing and Settlement adopted in November
2006.13
There is in reality only a choice between self-regulation
on the one hand, and public regulation on the other. The
main issue is how self-regulation is monitored (or even
compelled) by public authorities, and how possible switches
to regulation may be triggered and reviewed. Messy
compromises in the middle seem to satisfy no-one.
In order to make it easier to understand and to take
advantage of the possibilities which do exist for self-
regulation to play a role in European policy-making,
finally, it would be helpful to rethink and rewrite the ways
in which co-regulation is presented in European political
and policy debate. Current discourse is outdated and even
misleading.
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